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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1812 
Steven E. Siry, M.A. 
Morehead State University, 1980 
Director of Thesis: Dr. Stuart S. Sprague 
"The relationship between party politics and James Madison's 
1812 decision for war and a reevaluation of De Witt Clinton's 1811_; 
1812 presidential challenge to Madison are the subjects of this 
thesis. 
A significant part of my work is based on a provocative chapter 
from John C. A. Stagg's doctoral dissertation. In addition, I have 
used extensively Irving Brant's multi-volume James Madison, and an 
essay by Norman K. Ri'sjord on the 1812 election has. been of great value 
concerning the political situation within individual states. Primary 
sources used include the writings of the major Republican leaders and 
runs of prominent newspapers. 
I have interpreted the primary reason for the declaration of war 
in 1812 as being due to political expediency. During Madison's first 
two presidential years he was. faced with increased dissent within the 
Republican party by those desirous of a belligerent approach towards 
(v) 
Great Britain for nationalistic, economic, and/or. political reasons. 
Madison was not going to remain a spectator of this internal faction-
alism within the Republican party while waiting for the conflict in 
Europe to end and thereby solve America·• s diplomatic problems. He 
saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs. An 
insurgent uprising would have a devastatingly divisive effect if the 
malcontents threw their support to another presidential candidate in 
1812. Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat. Beginning in 
March, 1811 the President initiated a dual approach towards dissenters. 
This involved placating the pro-war faction of the Republican party 
while breaking all ties with those malcontents whose disenchantment 
could not be removed by merely holding a more belligerent attitude 
in foreign affairs. 
The Federalists opposed Madison's continuation of Jefferson's 
economic policies as well as the idea of war with Great Britain. With 
this web of conflict between the Federalists and the· Republicans and 
with the dissension in the Republicans' own ranks, De Witt Clinton 
saw a chance to capture the Presidency. Consequently, Clinton 
challenged the ruling Virginia based party by forging a coalition of 
anti-Madisonians and most Federalists. Despite the opinion of many 
historians, the New Yorker was politically astute; his ambitions were 
advanced by calculated decisions which came very close to success. 
But the events that Clinton used to oppose Madison were also the events 
that prompted. the President's counter-actions that kept the New 
Yorker from victory. 
(vi) 
The election results showed a sectional vote •. Every state 
located east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral 
vote to Clinton. And every state south and west ?f the Delaware 
river (save Delaware) gave its. electoral.vote.to Madison. Maryland 
divided. Of the original. thirteen states, 'Madison won ninety electoral 
votes to Clinton's eighty-nine, a virtual tie. But the five new 
states, particularly the four of the West that had obtained 'from the 
Virginian the war they had clamored for., .. gave. their thirty-eight votes 
_and the election to, Madison. 
Madison's politically motivated actions saved his Presidency 
and prevented a spl~tting of the Republican party. But the President 
. . 
also led the nation on an untimely and ill-prepared crusade. Delay 
would have been diplomati'cally and militarily the wiser course. 
Political circumstances, however,.had led Madison since 1811 to re-
.frain from any period of procrastination. 
Accepted by: 
i.,..-' 
(vii) 
The latent causes of faction are ••• sown in the nature of 
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of 
activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. 
A zeal for different opinions ••• concerning government, and many 
other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment of 
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power. 
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual 
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress 
each other than to cooperate for their common good ••• 
Federalist No. 10 
JAMES MADISON AND THE MALCONTENTS 
(i) 
James Madison came to the Presidency in 1809 as Thomas 
Jefferson's hand-picked successor. The times were unpropitious for a 
President advocating continued economic solutions to diplomatic questions 
because a majority of Americans would no longer be satisfied by a 
realistic though inconclusive foreign policy. In the eyes of many, 
moderation had come to mean lukewarm patrio~ism. The seeds of discord 
had been sown in the final years of Jefferson's Presidency; Madison 
would reap the harvest. 
The diminutive Virginian had been the heir apparent since 1800. 
When in 1808 Jefferson decided t~ follow Washington's example and not 
seek a third term, Madison, with key support from influential Republican 
leaders, overcame the opposition candidacies of George Clinton and 
James Monroe to win the Presidency. He was elected, however, more by 
consent than by acclamation. He did not command the esteem that 
Jefferson held, and he inherited a party threatened by dissension. 
Dissatisfied Republicans looked on warily and waited to see the-direction 
in which Madison would lead the nation. When that direction proved 
unsatisfactory, they rebelled. Thus, within two years of his being 
elected, Madison faced a political crisis of ominous proportions. 
(ii) 
Nationally there was a dissident group of Republicans who opposed 
Madison, desiring hostilities with Britain and/or opposing Madison for 
personal reasons. Individuals from the middle Atlantic states had an 
(2) 
additional complaint. Their region had rapidly increased in population 
and consequently increased their voting strength in Congress and in the 
Electoral College. The region, however, felt neglected in its ability 
to influence national policy. They resented more than ever the "Virginia 
Dynasty." The dissidents tired of a political system that lacked new 
concepts as alternatives to the "Virginia Dynasty's" connnercial restric-
tions and the Federalists' desire for free trade subject to foreign 
regulations. This disenchantment endangered the old Jeffersonian 
coalition which had been anchored in Virginia and New York. 
Western states were unhappy with the government's inability or 
unwillingness to move the Indians beyond the Mississippi. To some 
dissidents, it was believed that the British agents and traders dis-
obeyed the official government.policy which called for stopping the 
agitation of Indians, and instead, at times, Britishers were provoking 
the Indians to attack Americans. The political importance of Western 
unrest can be seen by the section's dramatic increase in population and 
1 . . 1 1 po itica power. Madison realized that it would be extremely difficult 
to be reelected if he did not retain the support of the West. 
By early 1811 the Eastern malcontents2 were attempting to alter 
the Madison Administration's policies, or failing to achieve that, to 
remove him from power. The insurgents were concentrated in Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Virginia, and New York. The insurgency began in mid-1807 
when Thomas Ritchie, editor of Virginia's Richmond Enquirer, and his 
cousin Spencer Roane pushed for energetic anti-British measures on the 
heels of the Chesapeake affair. Senator Wilson Cary Nicholas, one of 
the Jeffersonian floor leaders, was advocating war. By the following 
(3) 
year, Nicholas held the embargo and commercial restrictions in contempt, 
and because of these measures he refused in 1810 to return to Congress. 
Nicholas, two other Virginians, John W. Eppes and John G. Jackson, plus 
David R. Williams of South Carolina, composed the core of a Republican 
pro-war group. 3 Advocating war for natio~alistic, political, and 
economic reasons, they were the precursors of the famed 1811-1812 
"war hawks." 
The initial move against the Madison Administration came when 
the President's chief lieute~ant, Albert Gallatin, was attacked by 
Robert and Samuel Smith of Maryland and William Duane of Pennsylvania. 
In 1808, the Smiths and William Branch Giles had led a group in the 
Senate that blocked Madison's appointment of Gallatin as Secretary 
of State. Gallatin's appointment would not only have threatened their 
presidential ambitions since they could not use the State position as a 
stepping stone, but also the choice disregarded the key support they 
have given Madison in 1808 that helped fend off the Clinton-Monroe 
challenge for the Presidency. Madison finally appointed Robert Smith 
as Secretary of State. The controversy, however, left a legacy of ill-
will. The Smiths would continue to oppose the Madison Administration, 
believing hi_s foreign policy 'to be too pro-French, and opposing 
Gallatin's attempt to recharter the Bank-of the United States. 4 
Duane, too, aimed his attacks at Gallatin. Jefferson claimed 
that such attacks were based upon the belief that Gallatin told John 
Randolph that Madison had "no cabinet," and that Gallatin was hostile 
to Jefferson. Jefferson declared that the first item had been taken 
out of context and the other was false. Despite their lack of basis, 
(4) 
Jefferson believed that such opinions led to attempts to drive the 
most able man, except for Madison, from government.5 
Actually, Duane held grudges against Gallatin. In 1802 Gallatin 
had cut off Duane's lucrative government printing contract because the 
Philadelphian was over-charging. Furthermore, Duane had been a 
regular correspondent of Jefferson's but such communication had ended 
when Madison was elected. Duane blamed Gallatin for this. 6 
Overall, the malcontents had two main complaints against Gallatin. 
They considered the Treasury Secretary a roadblock to energetic foreign 
affairs. And secondly, many malcontents held personal grudges against 
7 
Gallatin. Thus, in early 1811 it was ·the Treasury Secretary who received 
the brunt of the hostility directed towards the Administration. Madison 
realized that such attacks endangered his reelection bid; that it would 
be only a matter of time before the most severe criticism was leveled 
at himself. 
On March 18, 1811 James Monroe wrote an extremely candid and 
prophetic letter to Senator George Brent of Virginia. It read in part: 
I am aware that our public affairs are far from beingin a 
tranquil and secure state. I may add that there is much 
reason to fear that a crisis is approaching of a very 
dangerous tendency; one which menaces the overthrow of the 
whole Republican party. Is the Administration impressed 
with this sentiment and prepared to act on it? Are things 
in such a state as to allow the Administration to take the 
whole subject into consideration, and to provide for the 
safety of the country and of free government by such measures 
as circumstances may require and a comprehensive view of them 
suggest?· Or are we pledged by wha~ is already done to remain 
spectators of the interior movement, in the expectation of 
some change abroad as t_he ground on which we are_ to act?8 
Indeed, Madison was impressed with the situation. He was not 
going to remain a spectator of the "interior movement" (the internal 
(5) 
factionalism.within the Republican party), while waiting for the conflict 
in Europe to end and thereby solve America's diplomatic problems. 
He saw the dangers caused by the malcontents over foreign affairs. An 
insurgent uprising, particularly if the Eastern malcontents gained 
influence over the Western states, would have been devastatingly 
divisive. Madison was prepared to act to meet this threat. 
(6) 
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But if they are carried further, and pushed w.i.th violence, 
especially in the Congress, or by those who have acted under the 
government, they• drive the members in the Congress, and the 
people at large, into the necessity of Clinging to and supporting 
the ch: Magistrate for the purpose of supporting themselves; 
that is, of saving the.party from ruin. Thus the misconduct 
of the adm.n, which under another mode of investigation and 
exposure would produce its removal, might become by a violent 
one, the cause of increasing its strength and ascendancy over 
the party, so long at least as the party lasted." James Monroe 
to John Taylor, 19 November 1810, Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., 
The Writings of James Monroe, 7 Vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1901), 5: 151. 
DE WITT CLINTON BEGINS HIS CHALLENGE 
In New York, Madison, like Jefferson before him, had favored 
the Livingstons in their battle with the Clintonians for political 
supremacy in the state. This was due to three reasons: (1) their 
friendship with Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, (2) the Clintonians' 
anti-Federalist roots, and (3) because the Virginians sought to 
maintain a balance of power between the Livingstons and Clintons to 
prevent either from gaining power enough to challenge the Virginians 
nationally. 
This Clinton - "Virginia Dynasty" animosity increased dramatically 
in 1808, when Madison, not George Clinton, obtained the Republican 
presidential nomination. This division was further deepened when 
Madison favored Clinton's rivals for government posts. 1 When in 1810 
George Clinton's health deteriorated, the Clinton mantle passed to 
his nephew, De Witt.2 
De Witt Clinton had been a powerful political figure in New 
York since the beginning of the century. As a member of the Council 
of Appointment and as mayor of New York City he had handed out 
offices, money, and charitable contributions. In this manner he 
consolidated the backing of supporters during the continual infighting 
of New York politics. Moreover, his political yosition was enhanced 
by his standing among the Irish and other foreign born citizens. He 
was greatly admired because as a United States Senator he had obtained 
a reduction in the period of naturalization from fourteen to five 
years, and he helped repeal the alien and sedition acts. 3 
(9) 
Clinton was opportunistic and pragmatic. He was a man of integrity 
but without a strict ideology. Yet among a generation of political 
figures who were thought to hold principle in more esteem than 
policy, Clinton was an outsider. 4 
In late 1810 and early 1811 unrest by the malcontents caused 
Clinton to turn his attention in earnest towards challenging James 
Madison for President. The death of Lieutenant-Governor John Broome 
in August, 1810 triggered the initial step. The state legislature 
passed an act in early 1811 that called for the election of Broome's 
replacement. Clinton, who had been appointed mayor of New York 
City in January of that year,.wished to fill the position and on March 
14, 1811, the Republican legislative caucus nominated Clinton for the 
lieutenant-governorship. 
Why did Clinton seek a position that was impotent and that 
contrasted glaringly to the power of Governor Daniel D. Tompkins? 
The answer lies in Clinton's presidential aspirations. Clinton wanted 
to maintain better party control and therefore he needed to be in 
Albany during the legislative sessions·. Such control of New York 
was essential to his presidential designs. He would have preferred 
to have been selected as a state legislator but he feared he might 
be passed over. 
Immediately, however, Clinton was faced with a challenge to 
his plans. The Martling Men, a splinter group within the New York 
Tammany Society, had been long and bitter enemies of Clinton. They 
first clashed in 1802 when Clinton spoke in opposition to Aaron Burr's 
intriguing against Jefferson. The bitterness grew when Clinton removed 
(10) 
Burr and his supporters from the directorate of the.Manhattan Bank. 
In 1809 Clinton's agents vainly sought to reconcile the warring 
camps. The Martling Men in 1811, led by Teunis Wortman, claimed that 
Clinton was looking only to advance his personal interests. There-
fore, they opposed his candidacy. The father-in-law of Governor Tomp-
kins, Mangle Minthorne, presided at the initial meeting. The group 
proclaimed that Clinton no longer supported Madison and thus the Martling 
Men nominated Marinus Willet for lieutenant-governor. 
The meeting claimed that it supported the caucus system, -an 
ironic statement since they themselves were attacking Clinton, the 
nominee of the legislative Republican caucus. As Clinton had feared, 
Tammany nominated popular Nathan Sanford for the Assembly, and thus 
prevented Clinton from considering an assembly race to gain a position 
in Albany. Sanford had been appointed by Madison to the high paying 
position as a New York district attorney, and it is doubtful that 
Sanford would associate with the Martling Men unless he knew that 
Madison approved. 
The Federalists nominated Nicholas Fish making the election a 
three-way race. As election day approached the contest became more 
bitter. A Clintonian meeting at New York's Union Hotel, was broken up 
by the Martling Men. Nevertheless, Clinton's support held together 
though he lost New York City. Upstate brought Clinton victory. 
Ironically, many members of Tammany, who opposed Clinton because of 
his alleged support of Federalist interests, voted for the Federalist 
candidate Fish.5 It was indicative of the factionalism and inclination 
towards temporary coalitions that made the New York political scene 
ripe for open rebellion within the party. 
(11) 
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MADISON'S NEW STRATEGY 
(i) 
Clinton's "availability" endangered Madison's political existence 
and southern dominance of the Republican party. This was in addition 
to other problems. William Duane's "Philadelphia Junta" exploited the 
bad relations between the Administration and Pennsylvania's Governor, 
Simon Snyder. Bad blood existed over the Olmstead Affair, a controversy 
concerning Snyder's initial opposition to federal enforcement of a Supreme 
Court decision against Pennsylvania. 1 Additionally, John Armstrong, 
Minister to France, resigned in August, 1810 over what he believed was 
the Administration's pro-French foreign policy. De Witt Clinton's 
brother-in-law, Ambrose Spencer, brought together Armstrong and the 
Clintonians in April, 1811. The meeting sought to find ways to make 
New York a more powerful force at the national level. Madison feared, 
however, that Armstrong might settle in Pennsylvania and become 
Clinton I s running mate •. 2 
In letters dated March 18, April 1, and April 19 the President 
wrote Jefferson that he believed Armstrong's animosity stemmed not 
from foreign policy but rather from Madison's reinstatement of David 
Warden to the Paris Consulship, a position from which Armstrong had had 
him removed. Madison believed it might become "the ground of an open 
hostility. 113 
(ii) 
Congress, in the spring of 1810, repealed the non-intercourse 
acts which prohibited trade with England and France. But if either 
(13) 
France or Britain repealed their acts against neutrals, the United 
States would again enforce a non-importation policy against the"other 
country. Consequently, when in August, 1810, Napoleon stated that the 
Berlin and Milan decrees no longer applied to America if the United 
States made England respect its rights, Madison jumped at this chance 
and proclaimed non-importation with Great Britain on November 2, 1810. 
Congress confirmed this policy by an Act of March 2, 1811. 4 
Madison's action became.controversial. It was apparent that 
French assurances that the Berlin and Milan decrees were revoked were 
extremely questionable. Madison did not denounce this deception, but 
pressed the British to renounce their orders-in-council.5 Secretary of 
State Robert Smith stated privately that France was violating its word 
and that Great Britain should be admitted to trade equality. 6 Madison 
saw Smith as a saboteur of his foreign policy, and the President felt 
now he had more reason than ever to remove Smith from his Administra-
tion.7 
Yet Madison, despite his desire to be rid of Smith, could not 
act until after the Senate, in which Samuel Smith was a major force, 
had passed the non-importation amendments. Thus, the President 
waited until after Congress adjourned. Such a delay also enabled 
Madison to have Smith's replacement serve some eight or nine months 
before his appointee would have to go before the Senate for confirmation. 
After Congress adjourned, Gallatin offered to resign. This would 
allow Madison to dismiss Smith at the same time. But Madison refused 
the resignation. Instead, ·through Senator Brent of Virginia, he 
(14) 
inquired unofficially whether James Monroe, recently elected 
Governor of Virginia, would accept the State position. 8 On either 
March 19 or March 20 the President asked for Smith's resignation, 
and offered him the position of Minister to the Court of St. 
Petersburg. On the 20th Madison officially offered Smith's position 
to Monroe. 9 
Less than two months earlier Monroe had written to John Taylor 
stating: 
The truth is that on points of policy there has been 
great difference of opinion between the adm.n & me. My 
letters to you shew that fact. This applies to the 
rejection of the treaty (Monroe-Pinkney rreaty of 1806), 
and to the measures that have resulted· from it. There 
can be no doubt that if I had had any weight in the 
publick councils our course would have been a different 
one. My views of policy have not altered, nor has 
anything escaped me to countenance such an idea.10 
But the promise of power and the national crisis of the time led 
Monroe to reconsider his position. He consulted political figures 
including John Taylor of Caroline and John Randolph of Roanoke. 
Randolph opposed his accepting, but the others, hoping Monroe could 
influen~e the direction of foreign policy, urged acceptance. With 
this support, Monroe accepted, though knowing that he did so on 
Madison's terms. 11 
Monroe's appointment aided the President. It rid the Administra-
tion of Robert Smith, it improved relations with the Congress, it kept 
Monroe from being a contender for the Presidency, and it helped unite 
the badly divided Virginia Republican party. But it also had its 
drawbacks. Discontent in the Middle States posed the greatest threat 
to Madison and the Republican party. Monroe, being a Virginian, added 
to the problem. In addition, if Clinton had had any doubts about his 
candidacy they must have disappeared with the appointment of Monroe, 
for his position as Secretary of State seemed to forecast a continuation 
of the "Virginia Dynasty. nl2 
The Smith-Monroe shuffle indicated that the President was 
charting a new course, one that he would follow until the Presidential 
election of 1812. This course consisted in breaking all ties with 
those malcontents whose disenchantment could not be won over by 
Madison merely holding a more belligerent pose on foreign affairs. But 
at the same time Madison did continue, as he had since the invoking of 
non - importation against Great Britain in November 1810, his policy 
of placating pro-war Republicans. 
In addition, Madison moved to mend his Pennsylvania fences by 
appointing Gabriel Duval of Maryland, a pro-Smith figure, to the Supreme 
Court, and replacing him in his position as Comptroller of the Treasury 
with Richard Rush, a Snyderite. And Treasury Secretary Gallatin pre-
vented Madison's opponents from gaining patronage power in Philadelphia. 
This alliance to the majority Republican faction in Pennsylvania 
brought Madison needed support. 13 
Responding to these moves, the malcontents mounted a counter-
offensive. Duane said Monroe's appointment was a sell out to the 
British; the Smiths attacked Monroe's record during the negotiations of 
18.06. Replying, Madison wrote in the National Intelligencer that 
prevailing problems were Britain's fault. He stated that the British 
blockade, orders-in-council, and impressment would have to end, 
(16) 
though he had told Monroe that impressment was not a major obstacle to 
a settlement. 14 
Robert Smith followed up this exchange with a new attack. Just 
prior to British Minister Augustus Foster's arrival in America, Smith 
published a pamphlet, "Address to the People of the United States." 
He charged that Madison was a meek Francophile who endangered his nation 
through his foreign policies. A more energetic man was required for 
the Presidency, one who would maintain American rights. Smith's 
"Address" was refuted by Joel Barlow, Minister-designate to France. 
Barlow claimed that Smith's only motive was to create opposition to 
15 
Madison without cause. The National Intelligencer said of Smith's 
pamphlet: 
We trust we shall, after this, hear no more of want of. 
energy in Mr. Madison's conduct respecting our foreign relations, 
especially not as contrasted with the policy of Mr. Smith,· 
as deducible from his address. The charge of subservience to 
France rest on no better foundation.16 
This conflict showed that Gallatin did not remain as the lone 
target for the Smiths, Duane, and their allies. The malcontents were 
now taking-aim at the President, and in retaliation Madison was 
pursuing a new course. Only the coming months could tell whether the 
detractors would bring down Madison or if the Virginian would emerge 
triumphant. 
.(17) 
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1811, Letters and other Writings of James Madison, 2: 492. 
12stagg, "The Revolt against Virginia," p. 23; Ronald L. 
Hatzenbuehler, "The War Hawks and the Question of Congressional 
Leadership in 1812," Pacific Historieal Review 45 (February 1976), 
19-20. 
(18) 
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TOWARDS WAR 
Jefferson complained during the height of the Smith controversy: 
The two last Congresses have been the theme of the 
most licentious reprobation for printers thirsting after 
war, some against France and some against England. But 
the people wish for peace with both. They feel no incumbency 
on them to become the reformers of the other hemisphere, 
and to inculcate, with fire and sword, a return to moral 
order. When, indeed, peace shall become more losing than 
war, they may owe to their interests what these 1 Quixotes are clamoring for on false estimates of honor. 
Jefferson, like other Republicans, had to reconcile the conflict 
between personal opinion and Madison's movement towards war. Ultimately 
to Jefferson the party was more important than the policy of the moment. 2 
"To the principles of union," he wrote, "I sacrifice all minor 
differences of opinion. 113 
Madison's more belligerent attitude began to pay off when 
Thomas Ritchie came out in favor of the President and against Smith. 4 
Madison's advantage coming from favoring the pro-war faction was 
enhanced when it appeared that Russia's imminent break with Napoleon's 
Continental System would lead to a Russo-French war. France was 
expected to win, leaving the British more dependent on the United States. 
Therefore, in Madison's opinion, the time to pressure Britain on 
America's grievances was at hand. If war resulted, the Administration's 
situation was more favorable than in the past as the Republicans now 
controlled Massachusetts, a state necessary for a successful invasion 
of Canada. Given the Administration's attitudes towards the world 
_situation in July 1811, it would have been very difficult for the Adminis-
tration and the British to have reached a mutually satisfying agreement. 5 
(20) 
When the talks between British Minister Augustus Foster and 
Secretary of State Monroe failed to reach an agreement, Madison on July 
24, 1811, issued a proclamation calling the twelfth Congress into early 
session. 6 The President's November S State of the Union message was 
another step towards war. Madison declared: 
I must now add that the period is arrived which claims 
from the legislative guardians of the national rights a 
system of more ample provisions for maintaining them. Notwith-
standing the scrupulous justice, the protracted moderation, 
and the multiplied efforts on the part of the United States 
to substitute for the accumulating dangers to the peace of the two 
countries all the mutual advantages of re-established 
friendship and confidence, we have seen that the ·British cabinet 
perseveres not only in withholding a remedy for other wrongs, 
so long and so loudly calling for it, but in the execution, 
brought home to the threshold of our territory, of measures which 
under existing circumstances have the character as well as the 
effect of war on our lawful commerce. 
With this evidence of hostile inflexibility in trampling 
on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress 
will fill the duty of putting the United States into an armor 
and an attitude demanded by the crisis and corresponding with 
the national spirit and expectations.7 
Hoping to even further ride the wave of war spirit, Madison in 
December 1811-January 1812 wrote letters to the legislatures of Tennessee, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina agreeing with their previous statements 
that American rights must be defended. To Governor Hawkins of North 
Carolina he wrote: 
I heartily join in the hope you express that the state 
of our national affairs will have its proper influences in 
converting party feelings and prejudices into united 
exertions against the aggressions and insults which 
8 the just conduct of our Country has failed to avert • 
The path Madison intended to take was clear. The progress towards 
a declaration of war against Great Britain had begun. There was no 
turning back. 
(21) 
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PRAGMATIC POLITICS 
In the late summer of 1811 Clinton saw an opportunity to-gain 
support from New York Federalists, At the August 6 Columbia College 
commencement exercises, graduating students each gave an oration. 
One graduate was told to tone down the political aspects of his speech 
which were-offensive to the Federalist dominated faculty and 
administration. He refused. Consequently, he was informed that he would 
not receive his diploma on that day. A disturbance followed when two 
students, Hugh Maxwell and Gulian C. Verplanck, demanded to know 
the reason for such an outrageous act against a fellow student. Sub-
sequently, Verplanck, Maxwell, and others were called before Mayor De 
Witt Clinton's court on charges of rioting. Clinton saw polftical 
possibilities. His slim margin in the lieutenant-governorship election 
was caused by local district Republicans having for the most part voted 
for Willett or Fish. Thus, Clinton felt he had little to lose among 
Republican support and much to gain among Federalists. In the end, he 
fined Verplanck and Maxwell two hundred dollars each, and the action 
1 
was popular among the Federalist ranks. 
Attempting to acquire additional support, Clinton looked to the 
West with a view to enlarging his geographical base. Kentucky was the 
most attractive state. It had increased its Congressional strength 
dramatically as a result of the new 1810 census, and it would be a 
great triumph to wrest this Republican stronghold from Madison. Clinton's 
agents had suggested that Henry Clay would be an ideal running mate for 
Clinton, In January, 1812, when Clinton was in Washington, rumor had 
(23) 
it that a Republican Congressional caucus rejected Madison and had 
chosen instead a Clinton-Clay ticket. But Clay's friends declared it to 
be a falsehood, started only to create trouble, and thus, the trial 
2 balloon, launched by the pro-Clinton press, burst. 
Throughout most of December and January, Clinton and Gouverneur 
Morris were in Washington, promoting the New York canal project. 
Others saw political motives for their presence. Senator James A 
Bayard of Delaware wrote to Caesar Rodney, December 22, 1811: "The 
characters of the two men (Clinton and Morris) are pretty well known 
' and it is rather supposed that they mean to open a road to the presidency 
than a canal from the lakes. Tho' a young republic we are already old 
in intrigue." And on February 1, 1812 Bayard wrote: "Morris who was 
here nearly two .months once appeared upon the subject of the canal 
before a Connnittee of the House and Clinton who came on the same 
business was never heard to say a word about it. 113 
Madison saw Clinton's canal project as a means to win New York 
State's support and possibly Western support for his presidential 
bid. Madison believed that Federal aid for the project was unconstitu-
tional but he saw the political dangers involved. Thus, after meeting 
with Clinton and Morris at the White House, the President sent a 
message to Congress which directed that body to take "'whatever steps 
may be proper on their part."' Because the canal situation could only 
be detrimental to Madison if he opposed it, his message avoided out-
4 right·opposition without going against his constitutional beliefs. 
Madison, the day he met with Clinton an~ Morris, attempted to 
remove another political problem by signing a reapportionment bill that 
I 
(24) 
showed the great increases of population in the North. The Congress 
had handled the minimum population in each district in such a way as to 
create large unrepresented areas in. the South. This gave the North an 
increase of eighteen seats, thus mollifying the outcry from New York and 
other northern states for a greater voice in the national government.· 
Even so, the Madison Administration made sure the increased representa-
tion was mostly in Republican areas. 5 
Following these actions, Madisun ·initiated another political 
maneuver. The Republicans in the Virginia assembly caucused in February 
and chose electors who endorsed Madison. This type of action had in 1808 
helped stop Monroe's candidacy. On March 7 Pennsylvania followed suit, 
but such support could not insure a Congressional caucus nomination 
unless a large number of states gave the President their backing. 6 
The Clintonians considered exercising a number of options. They 
still held out hope of obtaining Western support .despite their setback 
in proposing a Clinton-Clay ticket. At a secret Albany caucus on March 
16, Clintonians decided to remain inactive until states of the North and 
West could be sounded out on their opinions. Towards this end a 
committee of nine was appointed. 7 
Concurrently, the Clintonians looked to Washington in hope of 
finding if there was any support for a Republican Congressional 
() nomination of Clinton. With this in mind, the Clintonians enticed 
Congressman Thomas Sammons to leave in March for a journey to Washington. 8 
But before Clinton could hope for any support in Washington, he knew he 
had to demonstrate his New York support, particularly the gaining 
(25) 
of a nomination for the Presidency by the Republican legislature of 
that state. Thus, New York in the spring of 1812 was the scene of 
a major political confrontation. 
(ii) 
Previously, in February, 1811, the United States Senate considered 
the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. 9 The 
debate centered on the.question as to whether or not a national bank 
was so vital to the government's economic policies as to be considered 
applicable to the implied powers clause of the Constitution. Politically, 
the Clintons and the Smiths hoped that if Gallatin's request for renewal 
was defeated it would cause such financial problems that Madison in 
1812 . h b · d 10 mig t not e renominate. 
Vice-President George Clinton broke a 17-17 tie, casting the 
deciding vote against renewal. 11 This decision did not result in such 
Treasury problems as to hinder Madison politically, but the non-
renewal did send a large amount of uninvested cash capital back to the 
stockholders. People realized that New York City was replacing 
Philadelphia as the country's commercial center. This led financiers, 
many of whom were Federalists, to attempt to establish a large bank in 
New York -- The Bank of America. This created a great stir as the bank 
was perceived as the successor to the Bank of the United States, which 
12 
many considered as Federalist and British controlled. 
Chartering the Bank of America became·the focus of a vicious 
political confrontation that threatened Clinton's quest for the 
Presidency. For Clinton, political considerations overrode all others. 
Financially he would suffer if the Bank of America was chartered -- he 
(26) 
was connected with its competitor, the Manhattan Bank. Clinton 
explained that if forced to vote, he would oppose the charter, but he 
was not going to be drawn into the quarrel. In taking this stand, Clinton 
was severely criticized, for in 1805 he had opposed chartering the 
Merchants Bank because it would hurt the Republican party. 13 Jabez 
Hammond, a contemporary of Clinton and chronicler of New York politics 
of the period, states: 
On this occasion, as on many others, Mr. Clinton afforded 
evidence of a lamentable defect in his character as a 
politician. That defect was this: a neglect to cast 
about for means for the accomplishment of his end. His 
objects were always magnificent, his ends were always 
such as evinced an elevated and lofty mind, but he did 
not seem to be aware of the necessity of providing ways 
and means to accomplish these ends ••• 
-It is not improbable to me that the ardor of his ambitions 
hurried him into a determination to engage in this contest 
without any regular or fixed scheme of action.14 
To ·:the contrary, however, it would seem that Clinton was well 
aware of the ways and means that.were required to accomplish the 
desired ends. He had realized that he could not capture the 
Congressional caucus nomination. Therefore, he was forced to forge a 
coalition of dissatisfied Republicans and most Federalists. Practicality 
required that he begin such a coalition in his home state and build 
outward. Obviously he understood that he was running the risk of 
alienating a large part of his Republican support by his "alliance" 
with Federalists. Clinton was required to make completely different 
appeals to the two groups. He initiated his first major move towards 
building this coalition during the bank charter debate. 
Clinton hoped his charter stand would prevent him from alienating 
(27) 
either group. The deadlock on this issue, however, worked to his 
detriment. For those bank advocates who were dissatisfied Republicans 
refused to caucus to nominate Clinton until the bank was chartered. 
Clinton was extremely anxious that his nomination by the New York 
caucus occur before the Republican Congressional caucus renominated 
President Madison .. 15 Clinton probably believed that an early 
nomination in New York might cause the Congressional caucus to 
split. 
The bank bill passed the Assembly by a vote of fifty-two to forty-
six and was sent to the Senate. There a Committee of the Whole moved 
that it be rejected, but this measure failed. It became obvious that the 
bill would soon pass and become law subject to any action by the Council 
of Revision. This was the situation on }!arch 27, 1812 when Governor 
Tompkins sent the legislature a message informing it that the session 
was prorogued until May 21. The governor declared that the bank 
applicants had employed or tried to employ corrupt means to assure the 
16 
passage of the charter. Tompkins' accusation was based on the fact 
that a powerful lobby had been organized to achieve passage of the 
bank charter. The managers of this lobby included Solomon Southwick, 
a devoted friend to De Witt Clinton. And the managers employed a group 
of assistants who were not highly esteemed. 17 
According to Niles Weekly Register the prorogation by Governor 
Tompkins was". . in order, we are told, to ascertain the public 
sentiment through the intervening elections, on t~is momentous matter. 1118 
But a Clintonian paper stated: "A more aristocratical and arbitrary 
(28) 
measure, we hesitate not to say, was never, under similar circumstances, 
adopted in any government, short of an absolute military despotism. 19 And 
the Clinton men and the banlonen believed Tompkins' action was intended 
to destroy Clinton's presidential hopes and to allow himself to be 
20 a future presidential contender. Most likely, Tompkins' decision was 
made predominantly to prevent Clinton's New York caucus nomination 
until after Madison•~ Congressional caucus renomination. By proroguing 
the legislature, Tompkins prevented action on the bill and consequently 
Clinton was forced to wait until late in May to obtain the Republican 
endorsement in New York, In the meantime, Madison could act. 
(iii) 
During the weeks after prorogation, Tompkins wrote letters to 
prominent New Yorkers declaring that Clinton was completely committed 
in his opposition to the proposed bank. On April 6 he wrote to 
Colonel Henry Rutgers, stating: 
Suspicions seem to be entertained in New York that the 
Lieutenant-Governor has either been friendly to or silent 
about the Bank. Rest assured,, my Dear Sir, great 
injustice is done him by such insinuation, He has 
uniformly been as decided, steady, and open in his opposi-
tion to the Bank as I have been and as I really believe, 
interested himself more, and taken greater pains to 
convince members of the impropriety of voting for it, 
than I have done. His real friends will, I do not 
hesitate to say, be equally decided and animated upon the 
subject now pending if a disposition for·union and mutual 
exertions shall be met by a corresponding temper on bhe 
part of the Madisonians.21 
By this method Tompkins apparently hoped to prevent a split in the 
Republican party until at least after the April elections. He also 
stated: 
(29) 
This is the first letter I have ever ventured to 
write to you or any other person respecting the 
afflicting dissensions in New York; and I trust 
you will ascribe this departure from my usual 
studied silence on that subject to an anxious 
solicitude, if you view the importance of the 
approaching Election in the same light I do, to 
animate and draw forth your kind and good offices 
in producing a reconciliation amongst the 
Republicans of the city, at least at this election. 22 
Once the Republicans controlled the legislature there would 
remain six months to dissuade Clinton from continuing his campaign, 
or that failing, to destroy his political base. Despite Tompkins' 
best efforts, the Republicans failed to gain control of the lower 
house. And though the joint houses found a Republican advantage, 23 
there was, nevertheless·, a problem for the Madisonian faction. If 
the Clintonians and Federalists combined they would have a majority. 
Madison was renominated on May 18 by the Republican Congressional 
caucus by a vote of eighty for Madison and two abstensions. Fifty-
one eligible Congressmen were not present. Though many were out of 
town for reasons other than politics, the turn out was indicative of 
the strain within the party. John Langdon of New Hampshire, first 
President Pro-Tempore of the Senate, received the vice-presidential 
nomination with sixty-four votes to Elbridge Gerry's sixteen votes. 
The caucus adopted a resolution advocating its candidates, and declared, 
as they had four years before, that caucus members acted only as private 
citizens. 
The vice-presidential nomination was evidential of the Southern 
states' control over the Republican party; Langdon's nomination was. 
due to their influence and desires. Northern Republicans preferred 
(30) 
Gerry, but the South, assisted by the obedient Pennsylvanians, dictated 
the second place on the ticket as well as the first.
24 
The New England 
press acquiesced in the selection of a Southern nominee for the Pre-
sidency as New England, not New York, received the vice-presidential 
nominee. 25 
But Langdon, citing his seventy years, declined the position, 
26 and forced a second caucus. Here Gerry was chosen. Gerry 
would be of som~ help in New England, particularly Massachusetts which 
Madison still hoped to carry, and his age made him no threat to the 
Virginia succession planned for 1816. At the second caucus ten more 
Republicans supported Madison, thus more than two-thirds of the 
Republicans in Congress came out for the President.
27 
Clintonians immediately attacked Madison's nomination. The 
Connecticut Courant inaccurately reported on May 26 that the Republican 
Congressional caucus had been unable to decide on a candidate; that the 
28 
Northern members had·not even attended. Within a matter of weeks, 
Madison's caucus nomination had been approvingly confirmed by the 
29 Republican legislatures of nine states. Madison, with Tompkins' 
help, had foiled Clinton's plan for splitting the Congressional caucus. 
(iv) 
Three days after the Republican Congressional caucus, the New 
York State legislature reconvened. Immediately the bank charter bill 
30 
was taken up and it passed the Senate. By ending the impasse, 
Clinton's moment had arrived. On May 28 the Republican members of the 
legislature ~aucused to consider nominating Clinton for the Presidency. 
(31) 
Ninety-one of the ninety-five members in the New York Assembly were 
present at the caucus. Morgan Lewis and Nathan Sanford did not attend 
31 
for political reasons, and the other two were unavoidably absent. 
The caucus did not innnediately move to nominate Clinton, for a 
number of those present questioned the expediency of such action. Some 
feared Clinton's nomination would have a devastatingly divisive effect 
on the Republican party; some doubted that Clinton had a chance to defeat 
Madison; others supported the policies of the President; still others 
feared that Clinton would do irreparable damage to his political 
32 
career by challenging the President during a time of mounting crisis. 
But at this crucial point Pierre Van Cortlandt, Jr., and other 
members of Congress arrived from Washington. They pushed for Clinton's 
nomination, and they presented letters from Postmaster-General Gideon 
Granger imploring the caucus to nominate Clinton. 33 In the end, these 
voices, in conjunction with the death of Vice-President George Clinton 
the preceding month, helped obtain the support of the caucus. 34 
The caucus passed a resolution to proceed to nominate a candidate for 
President, and followe~ that with a unanimously supported resolution 
to back Clinton. The caucus then ordered the appointment of a 
Connnittee of Seventeen, one from each Congressional district, to 
further Clinton's election. 35 
After adjournment, the Committee of Seventeen published a letter 
entitled "To the People of the United States" stating that Clinton was 
a peace candidate and advocated the Federalists' benevolent neutrality 
36 
attitude towards England. 
(32) 
On the nomination, a Clintonian paper said: 
This nomination speaks a language that will not be 
misunderstood anywhere; and in our humble opinion, will 
tend more to lower the proud crest of the lordly 
Virginians than any measure which has been adopted 
since the election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency 
The people of all parties in the Northern and Eastern 
sections of the Union have had their eyes opened by that 
ruinous system of measures whi°ch has been pursued for 
the last ten years; by a government pretending to be 
the friends of the people but in reality their worst 
enemies ••• It must rejoice the heart of every 
good man, of every friend to his country, to find that the 
democratic-republicans of the FIRST STATE OF THE UNION, 
have dared to make a stand against the us~7pation and overbearing aristocracy of Virginia ••• 
The Madisonian press disagreed: 
We cannot but view with extreme concern the late 
nomination at Albany of a President of the U. States. 
We respect the opinions of our fellow-men, and the 
unanimity with which the measures passed certainly 
entitles it to serious consideration. We are proud of 
the talents of the candidate selected, and under other 
circumstances would have hailed with cheerful acclamations 
his nomination to the presidency. We are, however, of 
the decided opinion, and freely express it, that this 
nomination is extremely impolitic, and, if persisted in, the 
division and ultimate ruin of the republican party 
must ensue. 
These untoward circumstances are much to be regretted 
in the present state of both foreign and domestic 
concerns, and when unanimity is above.all other objects 
desirable ..• we ••• condemn the misguided zeal of 
his friends, in thus prematurely making use of his name for 
an object which cannot at this time be attained, and 
for a competition which we confidentially anticipate he 
will decline.. 38 
(33) 
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· National Intelligencer, 9 June 1812. Five days earlier the 
President's leading paper had stated: 
"On the relative merits of James Madison and De Witt Clinton 
let the question stand; and to the (Party) we cheerfully leave 
the award, (withto) single remark, that the men pronouncing 
these names in the same breath forces on our observation a 
contrast (so) mocked that we will not at present .. (trust) our 
pen.to describe it." National Intelligencer, 4 June 1812. 
THE DECISION FOR WAR 
Congress:fonal opponents, from November 1811 to February 1812, 
ridiculed Madison's war preparedness proposals as either too much or too 
little. In addition, on a number of issues traditional Jeffersonian-
Republican opposition to excessive spending and permanent military 
forces became a major problem for the Administration. By February, 
1812 it was apparent that Congress was moving cautiously towards war 
while also opposing the means with which to wage it. 
The Administration had to accept a·congressional commitment to 
impose taxes only after the war had actually begun, and even this 
decision was hotly debated before its passage on March 4, 1812. 
Furthermore, a plan to have the national government supply arms to the 
states' militia was defeated despite the Southern states being 
severely under-supplied. Then a proposal for the building of twelve 
seventy-four gun ships of the line and twenty frigates was defeated 
and appropriations for repairs was cut. 
Only on troop increases did the Congress favor more expenditures 
than did the Administration. The President was forced to advocate 
the raising of only ten thousand regular troops because funds did not 
exist to arm-or clothe any number beyond this. Congress' desire for 
more than ten thousand regulars was primarily due to the Smith-Giles 
faction in the Senate trying to make Gallatin and the Treasury 
Department appear penny-pinching and unpatriotic. It became 
strikingly apparent that the primary goal for some of the malcontents 
was the destruction of Madison's Presidency rather than the changing 
(38) 
of American foreign policy. 
As the spring of 1812 approached, Madison was looking for some 
major event that would compel the Congress towards a more belligerent 
stand. He hoped that the Henry papers would provide this. These 
documents, which Madison submitted to Congress, showed that in 
1809 while his Administration was negotiating with Great Britain's 
government the British had sent a secret agent, John Henry, to New 
England to find out whether British assistance would be accepted if the 
New·England states decided to separate from the union or remain 
neutral in case of war. 1 When Canadian and British officials refused 
to pay Henry for the information he had gathered, he turned to the 
United States. Madison was seeking national unity whe~ he disclosed the 
existence of the Henry papers. The President did not try to imply 
New England's complicity in the intrigue, only that of a small group. 
2 
Madison thereby hoped to get Federalists behind a drive for war. 
On March 10 Gallatin wrote to Jefferson that the efforts to preserve 
peace had failed because of the domestic factionalism. Gallatin 
added that war was unavoidable and that he hoped that the people 
would unite behind the government to prevent the dissidents from 
causing any more disunity. He believed the Henry papers would end 
all internal opposition due to public pressure. 3 
But the Federalists and the Randolphites doubted that the Henry 
' 
papers _chang_ed things, rather they were of the opinion that Madison 
was trying to influence the upcoming Massachusetts state elections. 
They said that on February 20 Monroe received Henry's letter relating 
what was in the agent's possession, but that at least twenty-five days 
(39) 
went by before the Secretary revealed their existence to Congress. 
The delayed disclosure, just twenty-eight days before the Massachu-
setts election, was deemed political in nature, the Madisonians hoping 
that the impact of the affair would not diminish by the time of the 
4 
election. But with war expected, the Governor's "Gerrymandering," 
and the general unpopularity of the Republican Administration's 
measures, the Federalists regained control of the state government. 
Also, the papers contained no names and stated no acts; the 
imputations pertained only to a conjectured situation. As a conse-
quence, the initial excitement began to fade. The effect of the 
papers was diminished further when shortly after their public ·release 
news of George Matthews revolution-organizing activities in East 
Florida reached Washington (see Chapter three -- footnote no. 13). 
Matthews, backed by the United States' government, was committing the 
exact type of activity that the Madison Administration was accusing 
Great Britain of having attempted. To protect their image as an 
innocent neutral that had been wronged, the Administration disavowed 
5 
Matthew's actions. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Henry 
papers suffered as a consequence of the incident. 
The Henry affair was the first of a series of Administration 
initiated steps in its effort to force a stand on Britain's 
activities. The President considered a sixty day embargo which would 
please those who wished to avoid war or to postpone the day of 
decision, and it would allow Americans to bring their ships into 
safety prior to any possible military action. 6 Additionally, however, 
(40) 
it would injure the British by stopping the shipment of provisions 
to Spain. Moreover, it was felt that by the end of the embargo 
the Hornet would have returned with news concerning Britain's 
decision on its orders-in-council. But in mid-March the French 
burned American ships along the coast from Philadelphia to 
Boston. 7 Secretary of State Monroe blasted French Minister Seruries. 
telling him that within a week the Administration had planned on 
proposing the embargo, and the declaration of war was to follow 
within a short time. The French actions, however, had perhaps 
completely endangered the Administration's progress. 8 
The French actions aroused not just the anti-Madisonians who 
had been promoting the idea of a triangular war, but also some pro-
Madisonians believed that France as well as England should have war 
declared upon it because of its actions against the United States. 
Later, Jefferson wrote to Madison concerning this: 
The triangular war must be the idea of the Anglomen and 
· the malcontents, in other words, the federalists and quids. 
But it would reconcile neither. It would only change the 
topic of abuse with the former, and not cure the mental 
disease of the latter. It would prevent our eastern 
capitalists and seamen from employment in privateering, 
take away the only chance of conciliating them, and 
keep them at home, idle, to swell the discontents; it would 
completely disarm us of the most powerful weapon we can employ 
against Great Britain, by shutting every port to our 
prizes, and yet would not add a single vessel to their 
number; it would shut every market to our agricultural 
productions, and engender impatience and discontent with that 
class which, in fact, composes the nation; it would 
insulate us in general negotiations for peace, making all the 
parties our opposers, and very indifferent about peace with us, 
if they should have it with the rest of the world, and would 
exhibit a solecism worthy of Don Quixote only, that of a 
choice to fight two enemies at a time, rather than to take. 
them by succession. And the only motive for all this is 
(41) 
a sublimated impartiality, at which the world will 
laugh, and our own people will turn upon us in mass as 
soon as it is explained to them, as it will be by the 
very persons who are now laying that snare. 9 · 
. Despite the "French crisis," the President soon felt 
politically sound enough to send a confidential message to Congress 
on April 1 asking for his sixty day embargo. The Senate lengthened 
the embargo to ninety days and the House adopted this amendment. 
Madison signed the bill into law.
10 
Then Madison considered Joel 
Barlow's announcement of a possible commercial treaty with France 
as placing the two nations back on good relations. The President 
hoped to get the United States moving solely and steadily 
towards war with England. On April 14 the National Intelligencer 
di lf . B .. 11 resume ts appea or war against ritain. 
Those who sought peace believed that.Congress' refusal to 
create two additional war department bureaus was a promising sign. 
The Smith group in the Senate had condemned the division of respon-
sibility and declared that Secretary of War Eustis was to blame. The 
peace men attempted to bring about an adjournment of the Congress to 
forestall any belligerent move by the President. The Senate voted to 
12 
adjourn but the House voted against it. 
On the extreme right John Randolph's Quids had opposed war 
towards either France or England. Their opposition to belligerency was 
based on the belief that war would lead to centralization and 
bureaucratization, and their cherished states' rights would be lost. 
They distrusted all government bureaus, but particularly the War 
Department which was for them a parasite upon the nation. 
(42) 
For years the Quids had associated themselves with Virginia 
Federalists. Now as war approached they became allied, to a certain 
extent, with other Federalists as well. The fear of war brought 
them together, and the fact that the Federalists now espoused a 
states' rights position strengthened the bond. Even in combination, 
however, the two dissenting groups were weak, and their effective-
13 
ness in Congress was correspondingly minimal. 
In March, Madison was probably hoping to have Congress declare 
war by the end of April. This would rally the party behind him and 
assure his renomination, thus slowing the Clinton challenge. When 
Clinton's plans were delayed by the bank controversy, Madison must 
have been very optimistic. However, the April elections brought a 
resurgence of Federalism in New York and Massachusetts. Most impor-
tantly, Federalist control of Massachusetts raised questions 
as to whether an invasion of Canada was still possible. Such an 
invasion had always been considered central to any war plans, thus 
this setback posed serious problems. 14 
Even so, the movement of events made the possibility of war a 
greater probability. Seeing the trend, the Clintonian press took the 
offensive. On May 5 the Connecticut Courant reported that before 
the embargo was enacted the House Connnittee on Foreign Relations 
conducted a closed-door interview with Secretary of State Monroe. When 
asked whether the United States was prepared for war, Monroe was 
proported to have stated: "'As to the prepared state of the country, 
in case of a declaration of war, the President would not pledge him-
self, nor take more than· his share of the responsibility. 11115 But 
(43) 
the President pushed the issue and within a week he began the final 
drive towards war. 
Madison's unswerving advocacy of war was crucial. War sentiment 
had been stronger, earlier, in Congress but the pro-war group in 1812, 
though loosely organized, still expressed the dominant mood. The 
President's stubborn persistence, with aid from connnittee chairmen, 
eventually solidified a sufficiently large Republican majority to gain 
his declaration of war. 
At this crucial point, there was total unity in the_ President's 
immediate circle. Madison dominated the cabinet. Gallatin and 
Secretary of War Eustis, despite their pro-British leanings, were 
solidly behind the President. Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton 
was completely devoted to the Administration and Monroe broke his last 
ties with the Randolphites.
16 
The cabinet met on May 11 and two days later the House voted 
to recall absent members so that they could reach Washington by June 
1. On May 18 the Hornet carrying diplomatic information from England 
arrived in America. Administration spokesman, Richard Rush, claimed 
that the dispatches contained no new revelations about British foreign 
policy. A secret session of Congress was held on June 1 and Madison 
. . 17 sent a message asking for a declaration of war against Great Britain. 
Aiming at the Federalists and those malcontents who had obstructed 
his proposed war preparations, Madison stated in part: 
And I do moreover exhort all the good people of the 
United States ••• (to) exert themselves in preserving 
order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority 
and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and 
invigorating all the measures which may be adopted 
by the Constituted Authorities, for obtaining a speedy, 
a just, and an honorable peace.18 
1 
(44) 
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WHY WAR? 
The New York legislature adjourned on June 20, two days after 
Congress declared war against Great Britain. New York Congressmen, 
for the most part, voted against the declaration either because they 
did not feel New York and the nation·were prepared for hostilities 
or because they felt the declaration was wrong. 1 Twenty-two Repub-
licans in Congress, mainly Clintonians, joined the Federalists in 
2 opposing war. 
Many factors had led to the decision for war, but perhaps the 
most important one for causing war in 1812 was that this was a 
presidential election year. Herman von Holst stated: 
The enthusiasts in favor of war were in a condition 
to- give importance to another element, and this 
decided the issue. The presidential election was 
impending, and the war party made the unconditional 
adoption of their policy a sine qua non of his 
renomination. That the threat could be carried into 
effect was to be looked upon as certain ••. Madison 
was not a man of such rigid moral firmness that his 
convictions could have withstood such a temptation. 
He fell victim, like others before him ••. to the 
presidential fever.3 
Richard Hildreth commented: 
The idea of being ignominously thrown overboard by the 
upstart and imperious leaders of the war party must, 
no doubt, have been in the highest degree mortifying 
to these veteran politicians, to whom habit had 
rendered official station almost a necessary of 
life ••• Madison and Gallatin might find excuse 
for submitting their own better judgment to the storm 
of popular passion, in the Republican doctrine of 
the right of the majority to rule; and they might 
hope, by still clinging to the helm, to diminish the 
calamities to which the country and the Republican 
party might be exposed, under more reckless and 
less experienced leadership. 
(47) 
Whatever might have been Madison's motives, this 
at least is certain, that, yielding to the urgency 
of the war party, he reluctantly consented to take the 
leadership in a new step toward war ••• 4 
If Madison had not decided in late 1811 to push the war 
issue, the war faction of the Republican party might well have 
placed its own candidate in opposition to the President or turned 
1
. 5 
to C inton. Though a peace candidate, Clinton had become many 
things to many factions. Madison was aware of this. As a result, it 
can be argued that the upcoming election was the deciding factor in his 
taking charge of the "war hawk" movement. 
Beyond this most significant step, Mad~son sought other ways to 
injure Clinton's candidacy. When the war began, Clinton expected 
John Armstrong, a major critic of.Madison's foreign policy and who had 
been at odds with Madison over the Warden· incident, to support his 
candidacy. But New York Governor Daniel D. Tompkins moved to have 
Armstrong appointed by Madison as Commander of the Port and Harbor of 
New York City. And Armstrong, due to his Revolutionary War service, 
outranked all Major-Generals of 1812, Tompkins thus desired 
Armstrong to 
President or 
have an independent command answerable only to the 
6 
the Secretary of War. On June 20, 1812, Tompkins wrote 
to Peter B. Porter; after expressing his position on· Armstrong, 
Tompkins stated: 
Will you please to consider this communication confidential, 
except so far as to make known to the President or Secretary 
of War alone its contents, in such a way as may be best 
calculated to produce useful ends and to convey to them my 
most decided opinion that no arrangement can be made which 
will be so satisfactory and beneficial as that of the 
appointment of General Armstrong.7 
(48) 
In short, Tompkins' political ma_neuvering and rhetoric 
persuaded Madison to use Presidential patronage to damage Clinton. 
On July 6 Armstrong, who had alreadybeen leaning towards a 
reconciliation with Madison, accepted a commission of brigadier-
s general with the command of New York City and its defenses. 
During this same period, on June 24, Tompkins wrote to the 
peace candidate Clinton. Obliquely, Tompkins reminded Clinton 
of his responsibilities to the state in his capacities as mayor of New 
York City and Lieutenant-Governor of the state.
9 
This was a coDll!lent 
by Tompkins on Clinton's peace position. And it was a sample of how the 
campaign rhetoric'was heating up as Clinton refused to end his 
challenge to Madison. 
(49) 
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THE CLINTON CANDIDACY: A RISING TIDE 
(i) 
Clinton's agents were in Washington and areas of New England 
1 during the summer of 1812. To Federalists they spoke of peace and 
to the Republicans they spoke of a President who could wage war effi-
ciently. Extreme F~deralists, like members of the "Essex Junto," 
were prepared to support Clinton as they had Burr because they hated 
Virginians. In New York, however, the Federalist party was divided 
in sentiment. Those supporting Clinton did so to be rid of Madison. 
Gouverneur Morris was so tired of S:outhern domination he favored the 
election of Clinton to assert the North's independence, even if the nation 
was split in the process. Eventually, Josiah Ogden Hoffman, Federalist 
lawyer and political leader, after private negotiations, pledged 
New York City's Federalist delegation to the Mayor. In addition, 
other leading New York City figures and several Congressmen 
conferred and gave their belated support. 2 This was a strong, though 
limited, beginning for Clinton as he sought Federalist support in the 
state. 
As Clinton was solidifying his ties with Federalists, a new 
problem arose within the Federalist ranks. Ben Stoddert, Secretary 
of the Navy under John Adams, started in July a "draft Marshall" 
movement. Stoddert believed Clinton was a second string Republican 
and Madison was a puppet of Jefferson. The man needed was John 
Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a Southern 
Federalist who could prevent the destruction of the nation.3 Stoddert 
(51) 
reasoned that any Federalist could win the ninety-five electoral votes 
to be found in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware. 
The difference between victory and defeat lay in Virginia and North 
Carolina. And Marshall was the only man who could win those two 
4 states. 
Albert Beveridge, biographer of Marshall, stated that were it 
not for Clinton's efforts and the Federalists' desire to retain Marshall 
as Chief Justice, the Virginian might have been a candidate in 1812. 
Beveridge believed that because Marshall would have done better among 
the mercantile classes, lawyers, and Federalists in general, that he 
might have carried North Carolina, Vermont, and Pennsylvania and won the 
election. 5 This was probably wishful thinking on Stoddert's and 
Beveridge's part. 
The Federalists were in a dilemma. Marshall's assets included 
not being tainted by any connection with New England secessionism and 
not having Clinton's reputation for intrigue. But the bottom line 
was that Madison must be defeated in New York for a Federalist to 
6 
win and only Clinton seemed able to accomplish that. 
On September 3, Stoddert told John Steele of North Carolina 
that his state might cast the deciding votes for Marshall, but if 
Marshall declined to stand as a candidate then Clinton would be taken 
7 
to save the country from Madison. Marshall declined and Clinton 
moved closer to obtaining a national Federalist following. 
(ii) 
New York remained a trouble spot fdr Clinton. To impress the 
(52) 
rest of the nation's Federalists, he must set his own house in order. 
William Coleman, of the Evening Post, visited Rufus King on July 27 
and said that Clinton had promised a group of Pennsylvania Federalists 
to make immediate peace if elected President. Four days later, Dr. 
John Mason, provost of Columbia College, met with Rufus King, and 
related how Clinton had told him that he would welcome Federalist support 
against Madison. But King declared he must confer with his colleagues 
b~fore answering. As a result, King met on August 3 at Morrisania with 
Gouverneur Morris, John Jay, and William Clarkson. Here, King revealed 
his opposition to Clinton whom he felt would abandon his present supporters 
and uriite with rival factions when politically expedient. Furthermore, 
he believed that so long as Armstrong, Tompkins, and Spencer opposed 
him in New York, he was too risky to endorse, especially when he might 
misrepresent Federalist motives. King wanted Federalists to keep their 
integrity by supporting no one or else a Federalist. 8 
Two days after this meeting, Clinton went to Morrisania and 
met with King, Jay, and Morris. During the discussion Morris read the 
proposed peace resolutions that were to be made public at the first 
meeting of the "Friends of Liberty, Peace, and Commerce" organization. 
Clinton wanted postponement of the public release of these proposals 
until after he had secured dissident Republican support more solidly 
behind him. He claimed he was not temporizing; he was permanently split 
with the Madison Administration. Additionally, he argued that had he 
followed the Administration's line he would have eventually become 
President, but he refused to follow such a course. The Federalist 
(53) 
9 
leaders refused to call off the August 18 peace rally. By now, 
however, most New York Federalists decided that they would risk 
supporting Clinton, King being the most notable exception. 
At Washington Hall on August 18 a large crowd adopted eight 
resolutions condemning Madison's anti-commercial policy, stressi~g 
the country's financial and military unpreparedness for waging a 
10 
war, and calling for committees of correspondence. 
The day before the Washington Hall meeting, a committee of 
New York Clintonians issued their "Address to the People of the 
United States," a document that sought a broad national public appeal: 
They opposed the Congressional caucus arguing that this was an encroach-
ment by the legislative branch into the area of the executive branch, 
and cautioned that the small minority that controlled the caucus might 
be influenced by a foreign power. The "Address" also appealed to the 
North's jealousy of Virginia and stated that New York, a middle 
state, might hold the balance between the conflicting agricultural 
and commercial states. And since New York was a frontier state this 
was even more of a reason for it to be the home of the next President. 
In concluding, the pamphlet said that Madison had led the nation 
unpreparedly into war, and that the Administration had been inept in 
conducting the war. By comparison, Clinton was an energetic, adminis-
. . h h d h b 1· d h . kl 1l trat1ve giant, w o a tea i 1ty to en t e war qu1c y. 
(iii) 
September brought the-Federalist convention in New York City, 
an event. that Clinton hoped would push him ahead of Madison. This 
(54) 
gathering resulted from a summer meeting at Saratoga Springs when 
William Sullivan, the president of the Boston branch of the 
Washington Benevolent Society, and some friends met shortly after 
war had been declared. There Sullivan and Jonathan Knight: both of 
. Massachusetts, and Connecticut's Governor Roger Griswold, decided 
that a Federalist convention should be held in the early autumn. 12 
Helping to bring these Federalists together were Philadelphia Federalists, 
New Jersey Federalists, and John Pintard of New York, all of whom 
13 · corresponded with Federalists throughout the nation. 
Through their efforts and the efforts of others, a Federalist 
convention was held September 15-17. More than sixty delegates· 
attended representing eleven states. In addition, there was extensive 
COIIIIIlunication with North Carolina and Virginia Federalists. Ohio was 
the only state that had active Federalists but was unrepresented. 
The delegates came from all the states north of the Potomac and from 
South Carolina, and they met at Kent's Tavern on Broad Street to hold 
thier proceedings. The small Southern turnout was due to distance and 
weather. In addition, the Virginia Federalists organized their own 
state convention. Overall, the delegates were chosen by state general 
coIIIIIlittees or coIIIIIlittees of correspondence and thus did represent the 
14 
state organizations though not necessarily the rank and file. 
No major Federalist figure was willing to accept the Presidential 
nomination -- Jay, King, and C. C. Pinckney refused. Consequently, the 
issue became whether to support Clinton or to sit out the race. 15 
Rufus King viciously attacked Clinton's character, and emphasized party 
integrity. This type of Federalist opposition to Clintonians had 
(55) 
deep roots. For between 1777-1800 the greatest enemies of the 
Federalists had been George Clinton and his followers. And even after 
1800 when the Federalists alternated their allegiance between fending 
Rep'ublican factions, there never occurred a time when a high 
, 16 
percentage of Federalists was aligned with the Clintonians. 
Those who did not trust Clinton and yet who, did not want to sit 
out the contest attempted to implement their "Southern Strategy," 
that is choosing some prominent Southern Federalist who might 
garner enough North Carolina votes to win. This was based on the 
original idea as proposed by Stoddert. The group, however, was 
confounded by a letter sent to the convention by C. C. Pinckney declaring 
17. 
that no Southern Federalist should be supported. 
The other position presented was the one that for the most part 
car.ried the convention. The Massachusetts Federalists led by Harrison 
Gray Otis felt that there was no hope_ of electing a candidate to the 
Presidency unless they combined with dissident Republicans. They 
18 
urged an alliance to defeat Madison to obtain peace. Otis managed 
to ,get a resolution adopted opposing the nomination of a Federalist. 19 
To 1Clinton, who might alienate dissident Republicans if he associated 
too closely with Federalist policies, the convention gave him all that 
he could desire. 
Five Pennsylvanians were appointed as a committee to learn the 
views of the electors picked by the states and then to inform the 
electors of other states. Therefore, most Federalist delegates left 
the convention with the understanding that a formal nomination of 
Clinton would depend on the judgment of the Pennsylvania committee 
(56) 
20 
and in particular the situations in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. 
After the convention, Robert Goodloe Harper wrote that the object 
was "'to let the Clintonian Democrats take the lead, in all the 
Democratic states and districts, and to support them silently with our 
votes.'" The desire was to carry all seaboard states from North 
Carolina northward except for Virginia. 21 Clinton's hope for secrecy 
vanished a month later when the National Intelligencer exposed his plan. 
Clinton and the Federalists denied the accusations but the disclosure 
22 upset their plans. 
After the convention the controversy in the press grew more 
23 
bitter. Maturin Livingston said that in New York Clinton's patronage 
control allowed him to maintain presses in all of New York's counties 
and to use the New York Columbian as a vehicle for propaganda. The 
Clintonian press attacked the idea of Congressional caucus 
-nominations and said that New York deserved a President. These 
positions were countered by the Madisonian press. First they pointed 
out that the President's renomination had been approved by nine state 
legislatures including Pennsylvania's and Massachusetts'. In Pennsyl-
vania it was argued that the Keystone state had a better claim on the 
Presidency than did New York, and yet Pennsylvania was supporting 
Madison. Overall, Clinton was backed by most Federalist newspapers, 
24 
and Madison by almost every Republican paper outside of New York. 
This alignment of papers, however, proved unimportant as in the autumn 
25 
weeks of 1812 many newspapers made no mention of the election. 
Despite the mostly unified support Federalists had given to 
Clinton, there were pockets of unrest. The greatest example was in 
(57) 
Virginia. In that state the Federalists were very weak with no 
representation in three-fourths of the counties. But as a result of 
their dislike of Clinton, the Federalists of Loudon County, at an August 
22 mass meeting, called for a state party convention to be held at 
Staunton on September 21. The turnout was disappointing as only thirty-
two delegates came, and they represented only ninety-nine counties and 
cities. Henry Lee and Charles Fenton Mercer wanted the convention to 
let the electoral nominees that were chosen to be given a>free,choice in 
supporting any candidate. This measure failed 15-16. The convention had 
a difficult time choosing a candidate although they remained opposed to 
Clinton, feeling that if elected.he only planned to be more aggressive 
in the application of Jeffersonian and Madisonian policies. 
In the end, the convention nominated New York's Rufus King 
and North Carolina's William R. Davis. The convention created a five 
member central committee in Augusta County which was to inform the 
electoral nominees of their selection and to arouse support for their 
candidates. The committee was to contact anti-war men throughout the 
state urging them to create local organizations for promoting King and 
Davis. The party capped its proceedings by condemning Madison and the 
Republican party for bringing on the war and for their conduct of it 
. i b 26 since t egan. 
(iv) 
Republicans attempted to get Clinton to withdraw his ~andidacy 
in late September. Most specifically, William King, Rufus King's 
half-brother, led a delegation of Republicans from Massachusetts to 
deliver a letter suggesting that in return for Clinton's withdrawing from 
(58) 
the race,. the Republican party in Massachusetts in 1816 might support 
Clinton. Since Massachusetts and the North in general had little 
influence in Republican party-decision-making, Clinton must have been 
amused by this worthless, ambiguous offer. In response to the Massachu-
setts proposal, Richard Riker, a leading a1d of Clinton's, released a 
27 
public statement, stating that the friends of the constitution 
throughout the nation looked to him, and he could not decline the 
service thrust upon him. Furthermore, he stated that political 
bargains were an affront to Republican dignity, and that he would 
28 
not withdraw from the contest. 
As the election date neared, the Madisonian press began an 
increased assault on Clinton's candidacy. One paper, on October 15, 
said: "We did think that Mr. Clinton would long ere this time have 
withdrawn himself -- but we have been disappointed in our expectation 
and we have now only to admonish him of the fate of Aaron Burr. 1129 
And a group of Pennsylvanians, in referring to Clinton's New Yor~ 
positions_, wrote: 
Mr. Clinton may have filled all of those situations 
with ability, and thus been a useful citizen of New 
York, but his usefulness has been confined to that 
state. He was so short·a time upon the national floor 
that the nation know him not; the nation have not tried, 
proved and found him honest and capable.30 
In addition, on October 10, Madison sent a letter to the South 
Carolina legislature acknowledging its address to the President and 
the Speaker. In his politically tinted reply Madison agreed that to 
maintain its honor, the United States had to use force and that South 
31 
Carolina was very patriotic in its actions. 
(59) 
These politically motivated statements showed that the expected 
collapse of the Clinton candidacy had not occurred, and that Madison's 
reelection was in doubt. 
(60) 
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THE ELECTION 
(i) 
Each of the eighteen states set their own date for the presidential 
balloting, with Louisia~a having been admitted as the most recent state 
on April 8, 1812. Most states picked electors in the same manner as 
in 1808, but there were some exceptions. Five states chose by 
general ticket with the winner taking all the electoral votes --
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio. Four 
states voted by districts with the possibility of a divided electoral 
vote -- Massachusetts, Maryland, _Tennessee, and Kentucky. The other 
nine states chose electors by the legislatures. In several of these 
states the legislature was elected during the presidential campaign, 
and by indirect election might reflect the popular opinion towards 
the presidential candidates. 1 
As the balloting began, Clinton was sure to win New York, New 
Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and Madison was certain of 
victory in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, and the states west 
of the mountains except for Ohio.
2 
Madison evaluated the situation 
on October 14 as follows: 
In the Congressional Districts the Republicans, I believe, 
have not lost ground at all, notwithstanding the auxiliaries 
to Federalism •.• Pennsylvania, although admitted to 
be shaken, is represented to be safe. New Jersey is doubtful, 
at least the same case with New Hampshire. North Carolina, 
also, is reported to be in considerable irritation. The 
other states remain pretty decided 3 
(ii) 
The New York legislature convened on November 2 to pick the 
(64) 
state's presidential electors with three tickets presented -- the 
Madisonians, the Clintonians, and the Federalists. The Federalists 
had a small majority in the lower house; the Republicans (predominantly 
Clintonian) had a majority in the upper house. The choice of the 
electoral ticket was by joint session, thus the Federalists could not 
win but might be the deciding factor. 4 A Republican caucus failed 
to nominate a list of electors thanks to Madisonian obstructionism. 
The Martling Men wanted a portion of those chosen to be for the Pre-
sident. The Clintonians refused this, and finally a Clintonian ticket 
headed by Judge Robert Yates was chosen. This arrangement was 
nominated in the Senate. In the lower house the Federalists had 
fifty-eight votes for their electors, the Clintonians had twenty-nine, 
and the Madisonians twenty-two. In joint session a number of the 
Federalists upheld the decision to support Clinton resulting in 
Clinton receiving seventy-four votes, the Federalist ticket received 
forty-five, while the Madisonians cast twenty-eight blank votes. 5 
In New Jersey the Clintonians surprised the Madisonians by 
holding a peace party convention at the end of June, denouncing the 
caucus system and nominating Congressional candidates who had opposed 
the war declaration. In this manner they hoped to attract dissident 
Republicans. The regular Republicans moved up the date of their con-
vention from the autumn to July 10 to meet this challenge. One 
hundred delegates met at Burlington and issued a public address setting 
up a formal convention for Trenton in October. 6 There they created a 
committee consisting of two delegates from each county to draw up 
lists of nominees for. Congress and presidential electors. Another 
(65) 
connnittee drew up a platform expressing its principles. 
In addition, the President made a rare campaign statement sending 
a letter to the New ,Jersey convention which found its way into the 
state's Madisonian press. In the letter, the President defended his 
action in the war, promised an honorable peace, praised New Jersey's 
patriotism during the Revolution, and appealed for the state to 
continue that tradition during the present crisis. 
The state election in October had a voter turnout that was very 
high statewide, yet the level of participation varied. Republicans, 
who were against the war but not for Clinton, stayed home. Generally, 
however, the election showed the high intensity created by the election, 
and the sophistication of the state's political parties. Madison won by 
a statewide majority of four thousand. But this vote was deceptive 
because the President's majority was primarily derived from two counties. 
As a result, the Federalists captured the legislature. The fusion 
of Federalists and Clintonians was more complete in New Jersey than in 
any other state except for Massachusetts and they innnediately replaced 
the popular election of electors with selection by the legislature, 
guaranteeing eight electoral votes for Clinton. 7 
Connecticut and Rhode Island were two assured Clinton states. 
Both were controlled by the Federalists, and both opposed the war 
because it disrupted trade. Delaware, led by Federalists James Bayard 
and Louis McLain, was cool towards Clinton. But Federalist controlled 
Delaware did support the New Yorker. 
Republicans controlled New Hampshire since 1806. Nevertheless, 
in 1812 the governor's race was very close and some Congressmen began 
(66) 
to break with the Administration. New Hampshire's Presidential el_ection 
was held on a statewide basis, and the eight Clintonian electors defeated 
their opposites by a vote that varied from 20,386 to 18,839 out of 34,800 
votes cast. The war had caused a greater turnout than the previous 
years' gubernatorial races, and the Clintonians-Federalists won the 
greatest percentage of these. The biggest gain was in the three 
traditionally Federalist, most northern counties which were mostly rural 
and which had no interest in maritime rights; instead they feared a 
8 
Canadian invasion. 
In Massachusetts the Republicans had gained in power since the 
1790's despite the Embargo and other setbacks. And in 1811 Massachusetts 
elected Elbridge Gerry governor and Republicans controlled the Assembly. 
Half of her Congressional delegation were Republicans. The coming of 
the war changed this. In the spring elections of 1812 Federalist Josiah 
Strong defeated Gerry for the Governorship by 1,370 votes out of·l04,000 
votes cast and Federalists regained control of the House of Represen-
tatives. 
For the approaching Presidential election the Republican Senate 
sought to have ~residential voting by the district system, hoping 
to win a portion of the electoral votes despite the increasing 
Federalist tide. The Republicans managed to have the state's twenty-
two electors divided among six districts, but lost all districts in 
November •. 
Since Jefferson's Presidency the Massachusetts Republican party 
had increased greatly, depending largely on small farmers of the 
interior and the rising merchants of the seaboard. They were parti-
(67) 
cularly strong in the mountainous west, in Maine, and along the seaboard 
south of Boston. But it was exactly in these areas that the Republican 
vote in November dropped dramatically from that of the previous spring. 
There was a suffrage qualification of one year's residence for the 
Presidential election that did not apply •in April, but the most 
significant reason for the decline in Republican votes was due to· 
dislike of the war. Since there was no corresponding increase in the 
opposition's vote it showed that many Republicans opposing the war were 
9 
also opposed to Clinton and thus stayed home. 
Vermont alone of all the New England states entered the Republican 
camp. Since the 1790 1 s the state had inclined towards the Jeffersonians. 
In 1812 the war was popular initially. The Republicans won in the 
September state elections; Jonas Galusha defeated Martin Chittenden by 
the vote of 19,158 to 15,950 -- a greater plurality than when he beat 
Chittenden in 1811. Except for Windham County in the southeastern 
part of the state, the Federalist majorities came from areas adjacent 
to Canada and Lake Champlain. The populace of these areas opposed the 
war that was ruining their Canadian trade and which might lead to 
. . 10 invasion. 
With the Republican victory in Vermont's state election the 
National Intelligencer, expanding its accusations as the Presidential 
election approached, stated that the hardy yeomanry of New England 
would not adhere to a group that called for a Northern Confederacy 
11 
as was exposed in the Henry letters. 
The September elections led to a meeting of Republican legislators 
at Montpelier on October 9. This caucus adopted unanimously a resolution 
12 
supporting Madison and Gerry. And on October 30 the legislature 
(68) 
13 
elected six electors for the President. 
In Virginia the election was held on November 2. The Federalists, 
due to the Staunton convention, supported King, though had King won, 
there was a chance they would have thrown their support to Clinton. 
But there was no doubt that Madison would win the state's twenty-four 
electors because balloting was by general ticket. 
As a result, only twenty-one thousand out of fifty thousand 
eligibles voted. The Federali,sts won the eastern shore, the upper 
Potomac, and the Shenandoah Valley (actually doing better than in 
1800). The Federalists increased their strength in the eastern 
shore and the lower Potomac, areas most exposed to the threat of 
invasion. It can be argued that the areas were also affected ~y Henry 
Lee, a native son, being one of the martyrs in the Baltimore Riot 
(see the Maryland election results). This sectional pattern had been 
fairly consistent since the 1790's indicating that party regularity was 
the most important force in 1812. Overall, Madison dominated by 
winning sixty-six out of seventy-nine counties and in thirty-two 
14 
counties he received between 90-100% of the vote. 
In the states of the lower South the Clinton campaign became 
inverted from the stance it took in New England. Completely 
discarding the 'peace party' label, the rhetoric became belligerent 
and spoke of quickly ending the war by more efficient wartime 
15 
management. 
The situation in the South, however, was not favorable to the anti-
Madisonians. The Federalists in South Carolina had been in decline 
(69) 
since 1800. By 1812 the party constituted only about ten percent ~f 
the vote of the state. In addition, in 1808 there was a reapportionment 
that gave the up-country districts a larger share of the vote, and in 
1810 all adult white males were given the right to vote as opposed 
to the previous des1gnation of only three-shilling taxpayers. The 
Federalists depended upon the planters, merchants, and professional 
men. In 1812 Federalists centered their effort in Charleston during 
the October state, elections. The legislature was to pick the 
presidential electors. However, the Federalists failed dismally and 
the Madisonians were assured of the eleven electoral votes in 
16 December. 
In Georgia, the Madisonians dominated the political scene 
even more. Federalists hoped to have the legislature choose Republi-
cans who opposed Madison and who were so highly esteemed that they 
could vote for Clinton without censure. This hope, however, was 
illusionary. In late November the Georgian legislature chose Madisonian 
17 
electors. 
Except for King's 
South did worse in 1812 
showing in Vi~ginia, the Federalists in 
18 
than they had in 1800 and 1808. The 
the 
pro-war South believed its native son, Madison, was the one for carrying 
on the war they had so loudly called for. And the states of the 
Southwest -- Kentucky, Tennessee, and Louisiana -- were also solidly 
in Madison's column. Madison had met their demand for war and they 
responded by showing their support. 
(70) 
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rbid: 
THE DECISIVE STATES 
(i) 
From the start the Clinton camp knew that its success depended 
upon a victory in Pennsylvania, or failing that, wins in North 
Carolina and either Maryland or Ohio. Such prospects were bleak ever 
since early 1812. 
The Pennsylvania situation was desperate from the beginning. 
Clinton had Duane's support but the Aurora's editor soon began attack-
ing Simon Snyder, Pennsylvania's Governor. This was disasteious to the 
Clintonians since they hoped to cause a split between Snyder and Madison 
by aggravating the wounds suffered over the Olmstead Affair. Such 
hopes vanished when the Governor in early 1812 made a toast stating: 
1 
"'The present will be the next President of the United States."' And 
then even before the Congressional caucus nomination, the Republican 
members of the Pennsylvania Legislature on March 7 prepared an 
2 
electoral ticket and pledged their support to the President. 
Knowing the size of the problem and the necessity to win the 
Keystone State, the Clintonians swept into Pennsylvania with ample 
funds and flooded the state with speeches and campaign documents. 
Special emissaries were sent to pamper and patronize Republican 
leaders. These emissaries, known as 'Boring committees,' had limited 
b di.d h d d . . 
3 
success ut create a roug -e ge state organization. 
A key part of this maverick Republican organization was the 
inception of a secret group at a meeting in Lancaster on August 26, 1812. 
The turnout was small, about a dozen, Congressman Joseph Lefever 
(73) 
being the only notable present. The meeting sent out an address to the 
people of Pennsylvania attacking Madison and recommending a state 
convention be held at Lancaster on September 24. But the convention 
saw only representatives from York, Lancaster, Nazareth, and 
Pittsburgh. Clinton was nominated and former Governor Thomas McKean was 
4 
chosen to lead Clinton's list of electors in the state. 
The most important move of the convention, in its attempt to 
overcome Madison's lead, was to name the Pennsylvania Federalist 
Jared Ingersoll as Clinton's Vice-Presidential running mate in the 
state. Though this helped to bring together Pennsylvania's malcontents 
and Federalists, it did not overcome the general Republican allegiance 
to the President. 5 Nevertheless, it made the Clintonian press very 
optimistic, and the press even speculated that Governor Snyder was 
coming around to Clinton's support and that a Clintonian tide would 
• 6 
carry all before it. Their hopes were in vain. 
Clinton's forces were on the short-end in a game of numbers. 
Except for the nomination of Ingersoll, the Clintonians had avoided the 
Pennsylvania Federalists, and refused to denounce the war. The 
Federalists' state organization was pitifully weak, it had only one 
member out of Pennsylvania's twenty congressmen. The party was 
active only in Philadelphia and the lower Delaware counties where 
Quakers and merchants opposed the war. Clinton's agents spent most 
of their effort trying to sway the regular Republicans by attacking 
7 
Madison's policies. 
The Madisonians countered these attacks by stating that the 
President was the peace and commerce candidate -- that Clinton made no 
(74) 
pledges on the war, ·either way. Moreover, the state Republican 
collllllittee of correspondence issued a continuous stream of campaign 
material to the county organizations. And on September 14, the 
Democratic Press, the leading Madisonian paper in the state, revealed 
the attendance of Pennsyivania Federalists at the national convention 
in New York, and soon after the convention the paper reported that 
the Federalists would not run their own candidate. Thus, the Clintonian 
desire for secrecy concerning connections with the Federalists was 
unfulfilled. The Gazette of the United States, the.leading Federalist 
paper in the country, hedged its reply to these charges. It said the 
Federalist party would support Clinton only if he had a chance, and it 
further said that there was no prearranged understanding.
8 
Despite th~se revelations the Pennsylvania Federalists did main-
tain more secrecy than did their Clintonian Republican counterparts. 
In fact, the day after the Lancaster convention, the Federalists held 
a conference at Carlisle which was presided over by James Riddle. 
They adopted resolutions similar to those passed at the New York 
convention the week before. The general public did not learn of these 
proceedings until revealed in a Federalist address only a few days 
before the election. 9 
10 
When news of Hull's surrender reached Pennsylvania, a major 
crisis occurred for the Madisonians. Word of the capitulation brought 
out a flurry of Clintonian supporters with bundles of pamphlets blaming 
the Administration for the fiasco. The agents especially moved among 
Pepnsylvania's western mountainous areas, hoping to cause the people 
of the region to give their support to Clinton. The President's 
(75) 
position was so tenuous that even the destruction of the British vessel 
11 
Guerriere failed to enhance the Administration's image. The 
possible effect .that Hull's surrender might have on the election worried 
Madison's supporters. Hoping to place the blame solely on Hull, their 
rhetoric soon turned in that-direction. Jefferson wrote to Duane: "The 
treachery of Hull, like that of Arnold, cannot be a matter of blame on 
12 
our government." And the National Intelligencer stated that there 
had been no deficiency of supplies at Detroit, and that orders for 
needed provisions had been issued prior to the declaration of war. 13 
Even so, there was much pressure on Madison by party leaders to 
dismiss Secretary of War William Eustis and shift the blame on to him. 
But Madison refused to sacrifice the incompetent Eustis. To keep 
14 
Eustis was a political liability, but to.have· dismissed the Massachu-
setts native might have been even a greater political liability in a 
state that Madison still expected to do well in, in the election. 15 
The threat to Madison's political fortunes was short lived. 
Military setbacks were offset in the Middle States by the export of 
corn and flour to Wellington's armies, raising the price paid farmers. 
During peace t:il!le the British had given such shipments special protection, 
and after war was declared, the Senate removed a provision that allowed 
for the enforcement of the restricted trade by the United States' 
forces. When critics asked about equating the flour shipments with 
the rights and true interests of the United States, Madison was 
evasive. He wanted to postpone the issue until his reelection. Madison 
knew that nothing could really be done until Congress reconvened, there-
16 
fore he saw no reason not to take advantage of the political situation. 
(76) 
Actually the significance of the grain exports went beyond this. 
The topic was discussed in letters between Madison and Jefferson. As 
early as April' 17, 1812, Jefferson, in a letter to Madison, attempted 
to justify the shipments: 
Supposing the objects of the government were merely to 
keep our vessels and men out of harm's way, and that 
there is no idea that the want of our flour will starve 
Great Britain, the sale of the remaining produce will be 
rather desirable, and what would be desired even in war, 
and even to our enemies. For I am favorable to the opinion 
which has been urged by others, sometimes acted on, and 
now partly so.by France and Great Britain, that commerce, 
under certain restrictions and licenses, may be indulged 
between enemies mutually advantageous to the individuals, 
and not to their injury as belligerents ••• I think a 
people would go through a war with much less impatience 
if they could dispose of their produce, and that 
unless a vent can be provided for them, they will soon 
become querulous and clamor for peace. 
Nine days after the declaration of war, Jefferson reminded Madison of 
this situation. Again on August 5 he wrote: 
Our farmers are cheerful in the expectation of a good 
price for wheat in Autumn. Their pulse will be regulated 
by this, and not by the successes or disasters of the war. 
To keep open sufficient markets is the very first object 
towards maintaining the popularity of the war, which is as 
great at present as could be desired. 17 
Another argument used by Madisonian Republicans in Pennsylvania 
was to declare that only by driving the British out of Canada could 
the Indian atrocities in the west be stopped. Actually, the renewed 
Indian activity was a part of continual frontier warfare that was 
for the most part unrelated to Britain.
18 
Madisonians argued that the 
war could be won most easily if the country supported the President. 
Madison's defeat would only signal to the British that the United 
States had given up the fight for its rights. How, they asked 
(77) 
. 11 ld Cl . hi d · . · ? 19 rhetorica y, cou inton ever resurrect t s· etermination. 
In addition, the Pennsylvania Madisonian press defended the 
Presjdent· and his policies. The editors stated that it was difficult 
and dangerous 
could provide 
to prepare for war in peacetime, and only Congress 
20 
the means. A great deal of pressure was brought to 
bear upon William Duane to completely reject Clinton and take a vigorous 
part in Madison's reelection campaign. 21 The pressure forced him to 
publicly state his support for the President on October 24, though 
some Philadelphia Republicans, led by Senator Michael Leib, remained 
22 
opposed to Madison. 
Preparatory to the state elections of October 13, Federalists 
were very active in ward and district meeting. In Pittsburgh ~hey 
offered their first ticket since 1808. Though they did not denounce 
the war in this western town, they did denounce the way it was being 
waged. But the Federalist-Clintonian coalition was a dismal failure 
in the state elections. 
23 
The Madisonians triumphed completely. 
The Presidential election was scheduled for October 30. The 
Clintonian electoral ticket, headed by ex-Governor Thomas McKean, had 
its own problems as a number of the chosen electors refused to run and 
the Clintonians were forced to revise their ticket right up to election 
day. In addition, Federalists dropped their neutrality facade, and on 
October 17 the party announced its support of Clinton. 24 
Most Pennsylvania Republicans had been and continued to be in 
the forefront of the war movement in order to preserve the Republican 
party. 25 As the election approached, their denunciation of Clinton 
became more vituperative. They began stating that his candidacy was 
part of a conspiracy: 
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.•. (New York) announces to the world a determination,. 
singly, and alone, to oppose, and, if possib:e, d:feat 
the deliberate choice of every other state, in which a 
democratic majority prevails ••• (Not content with the 
promised aid of the self-created convention of federal . 
gentlemen recently convened in New York: not content with 
the pledg~d co-operation of the self-delegated association of 
federalists which lately assembled at Carlisle; not yet 
satisfied with the spontaneous devotion of the British party· 
in America to the specious pretexts of her ambition:) she has 
ventured to introduce her political missionaries, principally 
the officers of her government, into every country, in the 
vain hope to ·seduce, to alarm, or to corrupt the democracy of 
Pennsylvania from the path of honor and of duty •• 
You are now to maintain the Republican institutions and 
character of our country, in opposition to a combination 
of the friends of an aspiring citizen, (De W~tt 
Clinton, who has deserted the democratic cause and party) 
with the federalists and the British party in America; acting upon 
principles and plans of the years 1799 and 1800, as divulged 
by their agent, William Cobbett; and recently promulgated and 
sanctioned by the acts and proclamations of the government 
of Canada.26 
·In the Presidential election in Pennsylvania Madison's electors 
averaged 48,946 votes to 29,056 for the Clintonians •. Nevertheless, 
Madison's majority was ten thousand less than it had been just four 
years before; his greatest decline came in the mountain counties of 
Western Pennsylvania where he was hurt by the issue of inept waging of 
the war. But still the President won a convincing victory and, 
most importantly, Madison garnered Pennsylvania's twenty-five electoral 
27 
votes. 
(ii) 
On Monday, November 2, the first.returns from Friday's election 
in Pen~sylvania told of Madison's substantial victory in that state. 
At this point, all states except three were solidly in either 
Madison's or Clinton's column. The election would be decided by the 
• 
(79) 
28 
returns frqm Maryland, North Carolina, ·and Ohio. 
With' the election hinging on these three states, the Administration 
tried to assure success by making one last attack on Clintoµ. On 
the 3rd, "An Address to the Electors. of President of the United States" 
appeared in the National Intelligencer. A part of it read: 
what are we to think of those who would encourage 
the illiberal prejudices, the blind jealousies, of a few 
malcontents; and lend the credit of New York, a name 
hitherto unsullied, to sanctify their mad.ambition, which 
would prostrate the most valuable institution of society 
to attain its unhallowed object? Among states, sovereign and 
equal by the compact which unites them, it is not by 
indulging an unholy hatred of each other, that they can 
hope to succeed in any object of honorable emulation. 
If Virginia be ambitious, is Massachusetts exempt from this· 
sin, and may not all the states in turn recriminate one 
another? Far better would it be to direct this spirit of 
rivalship to improvement in arts, and laws, and beneficient 
institutions; in a struggle which shall be foremost in
29 exalting the glory of the American name _____ ••• 
Additionally·, in conne.ction with the President's annual message 
to Congress on November 4, Madison released diploma~ic correspondence 
that became campaign documents in North Carolina and Maryland. These 
documents covered Richard Russell's negotiations with Lord Castlereagh 
during the summer. The papers seemed to show evidence of an American 
readiness for peace. But Castlereagh refused to end the practice 
of impressment during the proposed Armistice. The President announced 
further that armistice negotiations were continuing between Monroe 
and British Admira"l Warren, though the prospects were not promising. 30 
(iii) 
The state with the closest race was Maryland. The political 
divisions in the state were traditionally along geographical lines, 
as had been the case in Virginia. The eastern shore of the Chesapeake 
(80) 
Bay and the Potomac Valley were mostly Federalist, while the rest of 
the state was predominately Republican. As in Massachusetts and Vermont 
the Republicans had made steady gains in Maryland since 1800. By 1812 
the party controlled the state's House of Assembly, the Governorship, 
and held~ 6-3 advantage in Representatives to Congress. Thi~ structure 
made victory seem certain for the Madisonians. But then disaster struck 
at Baltimore. 31 
In the weeks following the declaration of war, two riots occurred. 
First, on June 22, the offices of the Federal Republican, the leading 
Federalist newspaper of the middle Atlantic states, were demolished by 
a Republican mob after the paper printed an especially strong attack 
on the war. Five weeks of silence followed. Then, however, on July 
26, a group of Federalists lodged themselves in a house in Baltimore. 
This group consisted of Revolutionary War Generals Henry Lee and James M. 
Lingan and other prominent figures. On the 27th they issued a denun-
ciation of the June 22 riot, and they maintained that there existed 
a conspiracy between national and local Republicans whose intention was 
to destroy the Federal Republican. These statements brought out a new 
mob. Both sides were heavily armed and in the ensuing exchange one 
Republican was killed. Soon the militia arrived, the Federalists were 
taken into custody, and the mob dispersed. When the militia disbanded, 
however, the mob reassembled and on the night of July 28 they broke 
into the unprotected jail. The Federalists were severely beaten and 
32 
James Lingan was killed. 
The result of the riots was that the public treated the slain 
Federalists as martyrs. In the state election in October the Federalists 
(81) 
won control of the House of delegates by a vote of 54-26, which would 
outweigh the Republican Senate in a joint ballot. The Federalists, how-
ever, failed to make use of their advantage. Instead, the Federalists 
quarreled among themselves. There had never been much support for 
Clinton in Maryland. And when Alexander Hanson and Robert Goodloe 
33 Harper supported the New Yorker, many Federalists rebelled. 
The Presidential election saw Maryland's eleven presidential 
electors being chosen by popular vote in nine electoral districts. 
Madison won six and Clinton five. Madison, due to heavy majorities in 
two counties, gained two electoral votes in the Federalist stronghold 
of the eastern shore. The decline in Republican votes increased the 
further the distance was from Baltimore and Annapolis which may have 
shown the rural areas' distrust due to the summer riots. Federalist 
gains came from the lower western shore, an area previously Republican, 
and probably resulted from disenchantment with the war and some decrease 
34 
in grain markets. 
(iv) 
With the split in Maryland, Clinton needed victories in both 
North Carolina and Ohio to unseat Madison. 35 The Clintonians knew that 
in all probability the chances of victory in North Carolina depended 
upon the method used to choose its electors. Since 1803 the state 
had used the district system, with the result that the Federalists in 
36 
1808 had won three of the fourteen electoral votes. But the 
Republican controlled assembly of 1811-1812 abolished the district 
system of choosing presidential electors and replaced· it with their 
election by the General Assembly. 
of North Carolina's electoral vote 
This virtually guaranteed 
37 
by Madison in 1812. 
a sweep 
(82) 
Many-people, including Republicans, were indignant over the 
arbitrary action of the assembly. County grand juries across the state 
condemned the action. This issue combined with the Presidential contest 
caused the summer legislative campaign to be the most active since 
1800. After the August elections, the Republicans feared that the 
election law had split their party. 38 When the election law was 
passed it was not known that Madison could afford to lose some 
electoral votes in the state. Thinking that a few votes might make 
a difference the Assembly had taken what turned out to be a great risk. 
In fact, there was nothing to gain and much to lose. 
The Federalists planned a campaign to take advantage of their 
new-found popularity. And by the end of August the state's Federalists 
had committed themselves to support Clinton, believing perhaps they 
could attract dissatisfied Republican legislators to their cause. 39 
It soon became obvious that Republicans who opposed the electoral law 
would not necessarily back Clinton. Also, the Federalist gains in 
the August elections were deceptive. They had gained only ten seats in 
the House and two in the Senate. The greatest Federalist victories 
centered on a group of ten central Atlantic coast counties near Newbern, 
and a group of eleven counties in the northern Piedmont. In these areas 
they elected thirty-three assemblymen, fifteen more than the previous 
year's figure. The Federalists •retained the loyalty of those in the South 
Central Fayetteville Congressional district, but in the other half of 
the state the Federalists actually lost five seats in the assembly. 
40 
Overall, the party had only nine against the Republicans' eighty-five. 
(83) 
Faced with this situation, the Federalists attempted to salvage 
some part of their position by persuading the state
0
assembly to repeal 
the electoral law. To accomplish this end, the Federalists hoped to 
induce a leading Republican to become Clinton's running-mate in the 
state. Governor Hawkins, ex-Governor Stone, and Nathaniel Macon 
were all mentioned. In particular, much effort went into attempting 
to persuade Governor Hawkins. Hawkins did not completely agree with 
Madison's war policies, but he was a member of the "Warren Junta" and 
he remained loyal to the Madison Administration. And without Hawkins' 
assistance in calling a special session of the legislature to try to 
revoke the electoral law there was little chance of overcoming the 
41 
Madisonian position. 
To compound the Federalists' problem a story circulated by 
Madisonians said that two Clintonian agents had arrived in North Carolina 
with funds to bribe the assembly. And Clinton's ambivalent war 
42 position did not set well with the staunchly pro-war state. When 
election returns showed that a complete sweep was needed by Clinton 
in North Carolina to win the election, the challenge to Madison quickly 
began to crumble. When the Assembly met in early November to cast their 
ballots for Presidential electors there was no doubt that the Clintonian 
plans for capturing the state's electoral support had failed. The 
Republican caucus whipped its members into line and the President 
won by an overwhelming vote of 130-60, with even some Federalists 
43 
voting for Madison. 
(84) 
(v) 
Despite the crushing news of the defeat in North Carolina, some 
Clintonians, even as late as the middle of December, hoped for 
eventual victory. This last, desperate chance was based on the 
fact that Ohio, which had been won by Madison, had lost one of its 
electoral votes because of the absence·of one elector. In addition, 
Pennsylvania had four vacancies occur among its chosen electors, 
and the state legislature had appointed new electors after the 
legally set deadline for such appointments. Thus, the Clintonians 
considered them to be illegal, and therefore; they also felt that 
this caused the rest of Pennsylvania's electors to be illegal.since 
they had all voted together. This interpretation did not hold up. 
All pf Pennsylvania's electoral votes were declared valid, and Clinton 
44 
ran out of time and votes. 
l 
(85) 
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THE END RESULT: AN EVALUATION 
Nationally, Madison won 128 electoral votes to Clinton's 
eighty-nine. The election had been sectional. Every state located 
east of the Delaware river (save Vermont) gave its electoral vote to 
Clinton. And every state south and west of the Delaware river (save 
1 
Delaware) gave its electoral vote to Madison. Maryland divided. 
From New Hampshire to Delaware, and including part of Maryland, 
Clinton won the electoral vote of every seaboard·state. Madison carried 
every other state in a contiguous but extensive grouping that spread 
from Pennsylvania to Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio, in addition to the 
isolated Vermont.
2 
Of the original thirteen states New England gave 
its forty-three votes for Clinton, the states south of the Potomac 
gave fifty-nine votes for Madison, and the Middle States gave thirty-
one for Madison and forty-six for Clinton. This gave Madison ninety 
and Clinton eighty-nine,.a virtual tie. But the five new states 
gave their thirty-eight votes to Madison. 3 
By the summer of 1812 there were three main viewpoints concerning 
how American diplomacy should be oriented. Basically, the Madison 
Administration believed that after the Louisiana Purchase and the 
destruction of France's naval power at Trafalgar, the French were no 
longer a threat to the United States' interests, but that Great 
Britain remained a menace to those interests. 4 . And a majority of 
the Republican leaders throughout the nation, particularly in the 
Republican strongholds of the South, West, and in Pennsylvania were 
against making concessions to maintain peace. Therefore, any such 
(91) 
ideas were discarded. 
Federalists agreed that Britain's policies were restrictive in 
regards to trading with countries on the continent, but they said that 
Napoleon's decrees already closed those markets. Hence; the realistic 
thing to do·was to trade under British regulations which still left the 
rest of the world's marketplaces open. With the destruction of 
much of Europe's maritime fleet and with the promise of new markets 
in the Spanish Empire, this avenue seemed even more to be the correct 
• 5 
policy. Furthermore, they believed that war with England was mere 
folly, and once it had begun they strove to end it immediately. 
Within this conflict of opinions between the Federalists and 
the Republicans, and with the added dissension within the Republicans' 
own ·ranks, De Witt Clinton saw a chance to cap·ture the Presidency, which 
had so long eluded New York and particularly his family. His 
viewpoint was that the war should never have been started, but once it 
had begun the most efficient administration should be in control. 
Moreover, he was convinced that the Madison Administration was 
unreasonably biased against Britain and too easily served France's 
interests. Therefore, he felt that his election would be the quickest 
way to bring about peace negotiations. Though unlike the Federalists, 
he was willing to continue the prosecution of the war in order to obtain 
just peace terms for the United States. 
Historians analyzing the Clinton candidacy have been almost 
unanimous in their condemnation. Such analyses tend to be inadequate 
for they blame on one man what was in fact a national malady. Though 
De Witt Clinton was ambitious for himself, he was also ambitious for 
(92) 
his state and for the North in general. De Witt Clinton was the 
product of twenty years of New York political discontent. In 1812 
he attempted to·create a new opposition party to oppose the ruling 
Virginia based party. In addition, despite what many historians have 
stated, the New Yorker was not politically inept. His ambitions 
were advanced by calculated decisions in which he weighed the 
conflicting political forces and developed a plan of operation that 
came close to success. 
But the events that Clinton used to challenge Madison were also 
the events that prompted ·the President into actions that prevented 
the New Yorker from achieving victory. And as a result, the defeat 
of the forty-three year old Clinton brought an end to his national 
political career. 
The crux of the election came down to whether Madison would 
decide for war against Great Britain. The malcontents within the 
party were the first to bring pressure on Madison to move in the 
direction of a more belligerent stand: And soon it was obvious that 
this met the desires of many of the.leaders in the controlling sections 
of the Republican party, They were desirous of a belligerent 
approach for a number of reasons including nationalistic, economic, 
and political ones. Thus, Madison felt that the actions by these 
malcontents would split the Republican party into peace and war factions. 
Believing the war faction to be the stronger of the two, the President 
began taking control of the move towards belligerency. 
Madison, like John Adams in 1799, was faced with a demand for 
war from within his party. Adams chose to suppress the movement though 
(93) 
it resulted in a split Federalist party and was a major factor in 
his failure to be reelected. Madison, however, whatever his feelings 
about a war, decided to take command of the pro-war forces. The 
President succumbed to political expediency. In so doing, he saved 
his Presidency, he prevented the Republican party from being split 
apart, and he led the nation into a war that was perhaps avoidable, 
Indeed, long-term preconditions for war, valid and not valid, 
existed, but the final decision for war·was determined by realpolitiks 
on the domestic political level not by realpolitiks in foreign affairs. 
In fact, the domestic considerations actually forced the United States 
into diplomatic maneuvers that were premature at best. The President 
failed to balance ends and means. As New York Senator Obadiah German 
said during the war declaration debates: "Can we look for a blessing 
without the use of rational means? Can we expect to reap, if 
we neglect to sow? If we do, the crop will surely be briars, thorns, 
6 
and thistles." 
A delay by Madison in asking for a declaration of war would have 
allowed the government more time to ready its war preparedness measures, 
it would have given the British more time to reconsider their 
orders-in-council, 7 and a delay would have enabled Madison to gain a 
more clear idea of Britain's position in Europe following France's 
attempted invasion of Russia. But politically Madison was on a very 
tight schedule. Since the end of the Foster talks in 1811 the President 
had not considered as desirable any delay in the push for war against 
the British Empire. Under such circumstances, the untimely and ill-
(94) 
prepared crusade was launched. America's true interests were relegated 
to second place behind the quest for political power. 
(95) 
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